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This study evaluates the impact of Sierra Leone’s 2010 Free Health Care Initiative (FHCI). It uses two nationally
representative surveys to identify the impact of the policy on utilisation of maternal care services by pregnant
women and recent mothers as well as the impact on curative health care services and out-of-pocket payments for
consultation and prescription in children under the age of 5 years. A Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) is
applied in the case of young children and a before-after estimation approach, adjusted for time trends in the case of
expectant and recent mothers. Our results suggest that children affected by the FHCI have a lower probability of
incurring any health expenditure in public, non-governmental and missionary health facilities. However, a proportion of
eligible children are observed to incur some health expenditure in participating facilities with no impact of the policy
on the level of out-of-pocket health expenditure. Similarly, no impact is observed with the utilisation of services in
these facilities. Utilisation of informal care is observed to be higher among non-eligible children while in expectant and
recent mothers, we find substantial but possibly transient increases in the use of key maternal health care services in
public facilities following the implementation of the FHCI. The diminishing impact on utilisation mirrors experience in
other countries that have implemented free health care initiatives and demonstrates the need for greater domestic
and international efforts to ensure that resources are sufficient to meet increasing demand and monitor the long run
impact of these policies.Background
The destruction of health infrastructure and flight of
qualified health professionals following 11 years (1991–
2002) of brutal civil war contributed to the collapse of
Sierra Leone’s health care system. Although some pro-
gress has been made in rebuilding the health care sys-
tem, Sierra Leone has one of the world’s highest child
mortality rates and maternal mortality ratios [1]. Charac-
terised by weak infrastructure, shortage of equipment,
medical supplies and qualified health professionals, the
health care system lacks the capacity to provide ad-
equate quality of care. Furthermore, high costs of care
and the fear of incurring such costs deter the use of
health care services when needed [2].
Against this backdrop, the Free Health Care Initiative
(FHCI) was launched on 29th April 2010 to increase* Correspondence: ijeoma.edoka@wits.ac.za
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maternal and child health outcomes [3, 4]. Under the
FHCI, children under the age of 5 years, pregnant
women and mothers of young babies (lactating) are
exempted from paying any medical charges including
consultation fees, medicines and medical supplies in all
government health care facilities as well as in facilities
contracted by the government to provide free health care
under the initiative. Unlike pre-existing national health
care exemption rules, the FHCI received significant fi-
nancial backing from the Sierra Leone Government and
international donor agencies [5, 6]. Furthermore, the
FHCI was accompanied by a range of health sector re-
forms to improve efficiency in the delivery of health care
services. These reforms, which include strengthening the
procurement and supply chain management system,
strengthening and redistribution of the health workforce
as well as payroll cleansing, were to ensure the adequate
flow of medical supplies and equipment to points ofs distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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particularly to rural areas experiencing critical shortages
[3, 7].
In the first few months following the implementa-
tion of the FHCI, utilisation of health service in-
creased sharply amongst all beneficiary groups [4, 8].
For example, use of health care services by children
under 5 years increased 2.5-fold, the number of preg-
nant women making at least one antenatal care (ANC)
visit increased by 20 % and average monthly institu-
tional deliveries increased by approximately 18 % [4].
In another study, Groen, Kamara [9] reported a 500 %
increase in the number of children under 5 years re-
ceiving surgical care, which was considerably larger
than the 17 % increase observed in children over
5 years.
Studies on the impact of the FHCI are limited and
have either been descriptive in design or restrictive in
sample sizes, thus limiting the strength of the findings.
This study attempts to quantify the impact of the FHCI
on child and maternal health care service-use and on
out-of-pocket expenditure using large scale national
data. For children, we use a Regression Discontinuity
Design (RDD) and for maternal health care, a time
trend-adjusted before-after estimation approach is ap-
plied. Our results suggest that while children under the
age of five are less likely to incur out-of-pocket health
expenditure, particularly consultation fees, no difference
is observed in the absolute level of out-of-pocket ex-
penditure incurred as well as in the use of curative
health care services in facilities where the FHCI applies.
For key maternal health services we find substantial, sig-
nificant but possibly transient increases after the imple-
mentation of the FHCI.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the
Methods section provides a description of the survey
data used, key study variables and an outline of the esti-
mation strategies; the results are presented and dis-
cussed in the third and fourth sections, respectively and
the fifth section concludes the paper.
Methods
Data and variable description
The study makes use of two recent household sur-
veys—the 2011 Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey
(SLIHS), to estimate the effect of the FHCI in children
under the age of 5 years and the 2013 Sierra Leone Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (DHS), to estimate the effect
on maternal health care seeking behaviours.
Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey (SLIHS)
The 2011 SLIHS is a nationally representative sample
of households in Sierra Leone. Approximately 6800
households were selected using a two-stage samplingprocess [10] and interviewed between January and De-
cember 2011. Data were collected on a wide range of
individual and household characteristics, including
health service use and health care expenditure. Utilisa-
tion of curative health services and out-of-pocket ex-
penditure were obtained from the health module
questionnaire completed by household heads or
household representative persons for each household
member. For utilisation, respondents are asked to list
two out-patient facilities and health worker cadre vis-
ited in a 2-week period preceding the interview. Data
on health expenditure and the owner of health facility
(for example government/private/non-governmental
organisation (NGO)/missionary-owned) were collected
only for the first visit. Therefore, we define utilisation
as the first out-patient health care facility visited when
sick. Given that the FHCI applies only to public facil-
ities as well as contracted NGOs and missionary
health facilities, we estimate the effect of the FHCI in
a subsample of those utilising these facilities. As a ro-
bustness check, a subsample of those utilising formal
private and informal1 health facilities is used. Total
out-of-pocket health expenditure2 is estimated as the
sum of consultation and prescription expenditure in-
curred for the first out-patient visit. The final sample
consists of children between 0 and 10 years who re-
ported being ‘sick’ in the past 2 weeks and had
complete data on health service utilisation, health ex-
penditure, individual and household characteristics.
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)
The most recent Sierra Leone DHS was conducted be-
tween June and December 2013 and interviewed 16,658
women of reproductive age (15–49). It collected detailed
experiences of women relating to their most recent child
birth over a 5-year recall period. This includes place of
delivery, ANC and postnatal care, staff attending, deliv-
ery complications, content of ANC and vaccinations
given to the baby during its first year. The 5-year retro-
spective nature of the survey means that information ex-
ists on births occurring both before and after the FHCI
was introduced. Mothers’ and households’ socio-
demographic characteristics are available in the 2013
DHS and used as controls. These include mothers’ age,
education (no formal education/ primary/secondary/
higher education) and religion (Christian/others); house-
hold location (rural/urban and region—Western,
Eastern, Northern and Southern) and, household asset
index quintile (lowest/second/third/fourth/highest).
Estimation strategy
The Regression Discontinuity Design
The Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) is used to
identify the effect of the FHCI in children under the
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experimental approaches for two reasons. First, RDD
is applicable to a single cross-sectional survey when
information on multiple time points is not available.
Although an earlier survey was conducted in 2003, dif-
ferences in survey design and data collection method-
ologies meant that data from the 2003 SLIHS were not
always comparable to 2011. For example in 2003, data
were not collected on prescription expenditure.
Second, while a dummy variable approach3 can be ap-
plied to a single cross-sectional survey data, the fun-
damental difference between children between the age
of 0–4 years (treatment group) and 5–10 years (con-
trol group) could result in biased estimate of the treat-
ment effect. The RDD allows the use of one cross-
sectional survey data while accounting for bias arising
from potentially incomparable groups. It exploits the
local randomisation of children around the eligibility
threshold of the FHCI to identify the treatment effect.
This implies that the level of treatment is discontinu-
ous at a cut-off point or threshold value of the assign-
ment variable (here, when age is greater or equal to
5 years). As a result of exposure to treatment, a causal
effect can be inferred under the following identifica-
tion assumptions [11, 12]: the change in the level of
treatment at the eligibility threshold is truly discon-
tinuous and the assignment variable is observed with-
out error; in the absence of the treatment, the
outcome of interest is a continuous function of the as-
signment variable at the eligibility threshold; and the
eligibility threshold is exogenously determined. The
last identification assumption which rules out sorting
of individuals around the eligibility threshold assumes
that individuals are randomly assigned around the lo-
cale of the threshold, resulting in a local randomized
experiment [11, 12]. In other words, children just
below the eligibility threshold are considered to be
comparable to children just above the threshold. In
this study the presence of a discontinuity in utilisation
and out-of-pocket health expenditure at the eligibility
threshold is tested using parametric regression ana-
lysis [12, 13].
Under the FHCI, all children under the age of five
should automatically be eligible for free health care.
However, due to limited compliance in some health fa-
cilities, not all eligible children receive free health care
[14, 15]. Furthermore, some non-eligible children would
have continued to receive free health care under pre-
FHCI exemptions guidelines. Therefore, the receipt of
free health care is not strictly determined by the eligibil-
ity rule. Under this scenario, the fuzzy RDD can be used
as opposed to the sharp RDD [12].
The fuzzy RDD can be estimated using the instrumen-
tal variable approach:Oi ¼ τ0 þ τ1Fi þ f Zið Þ þ ei ð1Þ
Fi ¼ α0 þ α1Ti þ g Zið Þ þ i ð2Þ
wheres Oi represents the study outcomes for child i, in-
cluding utilisation and out-of-pocket health expenditure; F
is a binary treatment indicator which equals 1 when child
i receives free health care and zero otherwise; Zi is age in
months, rescaled to zero at the cut-off point (i. e. Zi =
Aɡei − 60); Ti is the eligibility indicator which takes the
value of 1 if child i’s age is greater than or equal to 5 years
and 0, otherwise (Ti = 1 {Zi ≥ 5 years}); f (Zi) and ɡ (Zi) are
polynomial functions representing the relationship be-
tween the rescaled age variable and the outcome variables;
and ei and s i are random error terms.
In this study, F is not directly observed as data were
not collected on the receipt of free health care. There-
fore we estimate an intention-to-treat (ITT) effect, τ3
(equation 3), by substituting equation (2) into (1) to
yield the reduced form [12]:
Oi ¼ τr0 þ τ3Ti þ f r Zið Þ þ eri ð3Þ
where τ3 captures the difference between the out-
comes of children above and below the eligibility
threshold. A linear probability model is applied to esti-
mate the effect on health service utilisation (and the
probability of receiving free4 health care services). For
total health care expenditure, a two-part model [16] is
applied.
For each outcome, three models are specified to
test the robustness of the results to different func-
tional forms of f (Zi) : a simple linear specification, a
linear interaction specification and a quadratic linear
specification. The quadratic specification allows for
non-linear relationships between (rescaled) age and
the outcome variables, while the interaction specifi-
cations allows this relationship (or slope) to vary at
either side of the eligibility threshold. The model
that best fits the data or the optimal model specifi-
cation is determined using the Akaike Information
Criteria (AIC)5 [12].
Finally, the differential effect of the FHCI is estimated
by disaggregating the full sample into subsamples de-
fined by household location (rural/urban) and socioeco-
nomic status (below and above median total household
expenditure).
Time Trend-adjusted Before-After Estimation Approach
The FHCI was introduced throughout the country in
late April 2010. As a result, there are no suitable
control groups unaffected by the policy which can
be used to compare the behaviour of the treatment
group. We use a before-after design controlling for
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utilisation of maternal health care services.
Four key behaviours are examined as binary out-
come variables: obtaining four or more ANC visits
(the WHO minimum recommendation during preg-
nancy) at a public facility (ANC4); delivery in a pub-
lic facility and with a skilled health worker; postnatal
care obtained within 48 h within a public facility to-
gether with vitamin A supplementation 2 months
after birth; and uptake of child vaccination during
the first year of birth (diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus
plus hepatitis and haemophilus influenza type B
given as part of a three course combined
vaccination).
For delivery, postnatal care and vaccinations, we
assume that births from May 2010 are affected by
the launch of the FHCI. For antenatal outcomes, it
is assumed that births after January 2011 are af-
fected by the policy. The end date for maternal
care was taken to be the month prior to the date
of interview. For vaccinations the end date was
taken as 1 year prior to the interview to ensure
that adequate time had been given to provide the
full course of inoculations.
First, we use a mixed effects multilevel logit model
[17] unadjusted for time trends (Model 1) to estimate
changes in maternal outcomes:
Oijm ¼ ϕ0 þ ϕ2Pm þ ∅Xijm þ ej þ vm þ uijm ð4Þ
Where Oijm are the study outcomes for individual i
in district j at month m; Pm is a policy variable which
that takes a value of 1 when outcomes occur after the
FHCI was implemented and 0 otherwise; Xijm is a vec-
tor of covariates including asset index quintiles, age of
mother, maternal education and whether location of
birth was rural or urban, ej and vm are district and
time specific random effects and uijm is an individual
random error.
A weakness of the before and after design is that, in
the absence of a counterfactual, there is no way of
knowing whether the outcomes of interest would have
changed in the absence of the FHCI. Although there is
no comparison group, we mitigate this problem by in-
corporating a monthly time trend variable (Mm) (equa-
tion 5) and investigating whether the trend changes
after policy implementation. The time trend, Mm, is
coded from 1 (July 2008) to 61 (July 2013). Interaction
between the month and policy variables (Mm * Pm) is
added to allow for a different trend effect following
the implementation of FHCI. The revised model
(Model 2) becomes:Oijm ¼ γ0 þ γ1Mm þ γ2Pm þ γ3Mm  Pm
þ ΛXijm þ εj þ ηm þ μijm ð5Þ
Where, εj and ηm are district and time specific ran-
dom effects and μijm is an individual random error.
We use a two-step test for plausible causality to
examine whether the structural break in the data oc-
curs after policy implementation. Rolling time-series
estimation of average monthly outcomes for the en-
tire sample period was obtained. Since average out-
comes are proportions and so bounded between zero
and one, a tobit model is specified using the rolling
Stata function (window = 20). The resulting regres-
sion coefficients can then be graphed to visually
identify structural breaks. A Stata function (estat
sbsingle) is then also used to identify an unknown
structural break date in the data. Any identified
break in the data can in turn be used as an add-
itional breakpoint for testing the effect of policy as
well as acting as test of plausible causality since a
break occurring before or distant from policy imple-
mentation suggests that some other factor is causing
the change.
Results
Impact on utilisation and out-of-pocket health expenditure
in children under 5 years
An important assumption of the RDD is that sort-
ing of individuals around the eligibility threshold is
completely random [12]. While this assumption
cannot be directly tested, it implies similar distri-
bution of individual characteristics on both sides of
the eligibility threshold. Table 1 show that the two
study groups appear balanced for the majority of
observed characteristics except for two characteris-
tics—age of household head and proportion of
household heads with no formal education—both
are higher in the group of children over the age of
5 years.
First, we present a series of graphs (Figs. 1, 2, 3)
depicting the relationship between the study out-
come variables and (rescaled age). The graphs are
estimated as local linear regression models on both
sides of the eligibility threshold, using a triangle
kernel and the default bandwidth from Imbens and
Kalyanaraman [18]. A negative relationship is ob-
served between age and use of public, NGO and
missionary health care services (Fig. 1). However,
only a small discontinuity is observed at the eligi-
bility threshold where children just under the age
of 5 years have a marginally higher probability of
using public health care services (Fig. 1). A more
distinct jump is observed with the proportions of
Table 1 Descriptive statistics (if sick)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eligible children Non-eligible children Difference (2) – (1) All study children
Child Characteristics
Age in years 2.264 7.355 5.09*** 4.944
Male 0.544 0.525 −0.019 0.534
Household Characteristics
Rural 0.644 0.683 0.039 0.665
Western region 0.123 0.0948 −0.028 0.108
Eastern region 0.128 0.136 0.008 0.132
Northern region 0.422 0.474 0.052* 0.449
Southern region 0.327 0.296 −0.032 0.311
Household size 6.921 7.113 0.192 7.022
Household total expenditure per capita (US$) 293.8 276.2 −17.60 284.6
Head of Household Characteristics
Married 0.851 0.865 0.014 0.859
Age 43.22 45.33 2.11*** 44.33
Male 0.759 0.748 −0.01 0.753
Christian 0.175 0.157 −0.017 0.165
No education 0.693 0.752 0.059** 0.724
Observations 761 872 1633
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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just under the age of 5 years are more likely to
report zero consultation and prescription expend-
iture (Fig. 2a). This effect appears to be driven by
a higher likelihood of reporting zero consultations
(Fig. 2b), as opposed to prescription expenditure
where no discontinuity is observed (Fig. 2c). How-
ever, for children with a positive expenditure, no
clear discontinuity is observed (Fig. 3).Fig. 1 Non-parametric regression plot showing utilisation of public healthTo provide statistical inferences on the presence of
discontinuities at the eligibility threshold, we esti-
mate a series of parametric models (Table 2). For
each outcome, three models are specified—simple
linear, linear interaction and quadratic interaction,
and the optimal model specification identified on the
basis of the lowest AIC. The result shows similar
trends seen in Figs. 1, 2, 3. For example, at the opti-
mal model specification (linear interaction), non-care services below and above the eligibility threshold
Fig. 2 Non-parametric regression plots showing the probability of reporting zero health expenditure (for those who visit a public health facility),
below and above the eligibility threshold (a): Zero consultation and prescription expenditure (b): Zero consultation expenditure (c): Zero prescription
expenditure
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sultation and prescription expenditure. This appears
to be driven largely by the lower likelihood of
reporting zero consultation expenditure (at p > 0.1 in
the optimal model specification). For those making
positive payments, no statistically significant differ-
ence is observed with the level of total health ex-
penditure. Similar to the full sample, the FHCI effect
is also observed in children from more deprived
backgrounds (children living in rural areas and in
poorer households, Appendix 1: Table 6 and Appendix 2:
Table 7 respectively). However, these effects are only
significant at a 10 % level in the optimal model
specification.
The only departure from the Figures is observed
with utilisation of health care services where aFig. 3 Non-parametric regression plot showing level of total out-of-pocket
facilitiespositive ITT effect (higher utilisation in the non-
eligible) is observed in the optimal model specifica-
tion (Table 2). However, this effect is not statistically
significant.
Impact on formal private and informal/other health care
service use
Figures 4, 5, 66 graphically depict the effect of the
FHCI on private and informal/other health care
service use and out-of-pocket health expenditure. A
distinct jump is observed at the eligibility threshold
for informal service use—children over the age of
5 years are more likely to use these services (Fig. 4b).
The result is confirmed by the parametric model
which shows a statistically significant difference (of
approximately 10 percentage points) (Table 3).expenditure (US$) for expenditure greater than zero in public health
Table 2 The impact of the FHCI in public/NGO/missionary health facilities
Simple linear Linear interaction Quadratic interaction
Utilisation (LPM)
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) −0.0310 −0.0197 0.0885
(0.060) (0.061) (0.098)
N 1633 1633 1633
AIC 2235.2 2236.5 2234.3a
Probability of reporting zero consultation and prescription expenditure (LPM)
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) −0.134* −0.142** −0.0938
(0.071) (0.071) (0.116)
N 915 915 915
AIC 1180.8a 1182.3 1186.0
Probability of reporting zero consultation expenditure (LPM)
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) −0.121* −0.126* −0.0359
(0.073) (0.072) (0.113)
N 915 915 915
AIC 1136.5a 1138.3 1141.2
Probability of reporting zero prescription expenditure (LPM)
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) −0.0410 −0.0628 −0.0600
(0.058) (0.059) (0.095)
N 915 915 915
AIC 1005.8 1003.9a 1007.8
Total expenditure (two-part model showing marginal effects)
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) −0.144 −0.0827 −0.623
(0.462) (0.436) (1.753)
N 915 915 915
AIC 686.0 685.94 685.93a
Control variables includes region dummies, head of households’ age and education
Standard errors in parentheses
LPM linear probability model
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05
aOptimal model specification
Fig. 4 Non-parametric regression plots showing utilisation of health care services below and above the eligibility threshold, in: a Private formal
health facilities b Informal/other health facilities
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Fig. 5 Non-parametric regression plots showing the probability of reporting zero health expenditure (for those who visit a health facility), below
and above the eligibility threshold a Private formal health facilities b Informal/other health facilities
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proportion of those reporting zero health expend-
iture within formal private health facilities (Fig. 5a),
this effect is statistically insignificant (Table 3). This
is unsurprising given the high variance observed in
the data points, particular above the eligibility
threshold (Fig. 5a). Overall, for all those utilising for-
mal private or informal health care services there
appears to be no difference between both groups in
the level of total health expenditure.
Impact on maternal health seeking behaviours
Approximately two thirds of the sample gave birth
after the FHCI was in place and so were assumed to
be affected by the policy (Table 4). The mean values of
most covariates are similar for observations in the
pre- and post-FHCI period although the proportion
with secondary education is higher in the post-FHCI
period. The majority of study outcomes are higher in
the post-FHCI group. Of particular note is the in-
crease in proportion receiving timely postnatal careFig. 6 Non-parametric regression plots showing level of total out-of-pocke
formal health facilities b Informal/other health facilities(by 14.5 percentage points). Delivery with a skilled
health worker and delivery at a government facility are
5.2 and 5.4 percentage points, respectively, higher in
the post-FHCI period.
The regression models are estimated for two struc-
tural ‘breakpoints’. The first structural breakpoint is
based on the official start of the policy. Given that
the FHCI was introduced at the end of April 2010, a
break point of May 2010 is used. The second is
based on the rolling tobit estimation. Visual inspec-
tion and the use of the structural break function find
a shift in the intercept for key variables around
2 months after policy implementation.7 Finding a
lagged effect is perhaps not surprising since it is
likely to take time for health care seeking behaviour
to change. Both models are estimated for both policy
breakpoints.
A simple before and after comparison, based on
equation (4) suggests a statistically significant in-
crease (p < 0.01) in ANC4, public facility deliveries,
delivery with skilled health workers, postnatal caret health expenditure (US$), for expenditure greater than zero a Private
Table 3 The impact of the FHCI in formal and informal health facilities
Formal private Informal private/others
Simple linear Linear interaction Quadratic interaction Simple linear Linear interaction Quadratic interaction
Utilisation (LPM)
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) −0.0286 −0.0377 −0.0875 0.0995** 0.105** 0.0526
(0.031) (0.033) (0.069) (0.050) (0.050) (0.083)
N 1633 1633 1633 1633 1633 1633
AIC 566.7a 567.4 568.2 1774.2a 1776.0 1779.3
Probability of reporting zero consultation and prescription expenditure (LPM)
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) 0.0946 0.0980 0.0902 0.00674 −0.0694 −0.0659
(0.197) (0.193) (0.339) (0.081) (0.094) (0.146)
N 152 152 152 465 465 465
AIC 226.0a 228.0 231.9 519.6 518.6a 522.3
Total expenditure (two-part model showing marginal effects) b
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) −0.948 −1.104 −139.1 0.190 0.245 −3.891
(1.239) (1.525) (308.367) (0.201) (0.194) (10.624)
N 152 152 152 465 465 465
AIC 626.9 624.5 618.4a 419.6 419.1 417.1a
Control variables includes region dummies, head of households’ age and education
Standard errors in parentheses
LPM linear probability model
**p < 0.05
aOptimal model specification
bRegional dummies excluded for informal private/others due to no observations in the Western region
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(Table 5, Model 1). Similar changes in the propor-
tion of women reporting each outcome (marginal
effects) are reported for the two breakpoints. As ex-
pected, given that the FHCI mostly only applies to
public services, there is no significant increase in
private delivery care.
Incorporating month and interaction terms into
the model helps to separate the effect of the inter-
vention from general trends in outcome variables
(Table 5, Model 2). The marginal effects of the im-
mediate policy impact are mostly larger in Model 2
compared to Model 1 particularly for services pro-
vided postnatally: 15.6 % for vitamin A supplementa-
tion (p < 0.01) and 14.0 % for full course DPT vaccination
for infants (p < 0.01). The modest increase in delivery
with a trained health worker (5.1 %, p < 0.1) contrasts
with the larger impact (6.8 %, p < 0.05) for delivery in
a government facility suggesting that some of the ef-
fect of the policy may be to incentivise women to de-
liver in a facility rather than with a trained health
worker at home. The effects are generally larger for
the breakpoint of June rather than May, supporting a
lagged effect of the policy change. Likelihood ratio
tests justify selection of Model 2 over Model 1 for all
but use of private facilities and ANC4.A general improvement in outcomes over time, in-
dependent of the policy, is suggested for delivery with
a trained health worker, use of postnatal care and full
course DPT to infants. The negative coefficients on
most of the policy-time trend interactions suggest that
the policy effect may diminish over time. In most
cases this coefficient is lower in absolute value than
the general trend term suggesting that outcomes con-
tinue to improve but at a slower rate than in the past.
The results are robust to disaggregation by region and
into rural and urban areas (the impact is slightly larger
in rural areas).
Discussion
This study investigates the extent to which Sierra
Leone’s FHCI increased access to health care ser-
vices and reduced financial risks associated with
seeking health care among beneficiaries of the pol-
icy. Our results suggest that children under the
age of 5 years (eligible children), are less likely to
pay consultation and prescription charges in public
health facilities where the FHCI applies. However
this effect fails to translate into a discernible im-
pact on children’s use of health care services. One
reason why the FHCI may have had less impact
than expected on utilisation is the costs that are
Table 4 Mean characteristics of women before and after the FHCI
Variables Pre-FHCI Post-FHCI Difference (Post-Pre) All
ANC Outcome Variablesa
Received skilled ANC during pregnancy 0.963 0.973 0.01 0.968
ANC received at public facility 0.955 0.969 0.014 0.964
Four ANC visits at public facility 0.751 0.771 0.02 0.508
Obs. 2685 5630 8315
PNC Outcome Variables
Health Facility for Delivery
Government facility 0.447 0.501 0.054 0.479
Government hospital 0.12 0.134 0.014 0.129
Government health centre 0.329 0.369 0.04 0.352
Private facility 0.017 0.018 0.001 0.017
Delivery with skilled health worker 0.584 0.636 0.052 0.616
Postnatal care within 48 h of birth in public facility 0.121 0.266 0.145 0.208
Vitamin A given within 2 months of delivery 0.816 0.788 −0.028 0.813
3 courses of DPT received within 12 months of delivery (DPT3) b 0.609 0.625 0.016 0.691
Obs. 3968 7970 11,938
Covariates
Age 30.5 28.38 −2.12 29.34
Urban 0.315 0.302 −0.013 0.308
Christian 0.19 0.187 −0.003 0.19
Mother’s education
Primary education 0.127 0.142 0.015 0.133
Secondary education 0.136 0.184 0.048 0.164
Higher education 0.016 0.01 −0.006 0.012
Asset index quintile
Lowest 0.232 0.232 0 0.233
Second 0.194 0.2 0.006 0.199
Middle 0.204 0.202 −0.002 0.199
Fourth 0.215 0.22 0.005 0.218
Highest 0.155 0.147 −0.008 0.15
Eastern Region 0.228 0.213 −0.015 0.221
Northern Region 0.384 0.396 0.012 0.385
Southern Region 0.279 0.277 −0.002 0.281
Western Region 0.11 0.114 0.004 0.113
aPolicy implementation assumed to be 9 months prior to delivery date
bDeliveries excluded from November 2012 to allow for 1 year vaccination period
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that eligible children are on average less likely to
incur any out-of-pocket health expenditure in pub-
lic facilities, a proportion of eligible children still
do at levels comparable to non-eligible children.
These findings are consistent with other studies
which have shown that other beneficiaries of the
FHCI (pregnant women and recent mothers), oftenbear the cost of medicines and medical supplies in
public health care facilities [14, 15, 19]. In public
health facilities, medicines are available either as
FHCI drugs for FHCI beneficiaries or as cost re-
covery drugs for non-beneficiaries. Apparent short-
ages of FHCI medicines in these facilities often
result in beneficiaries paying for medicines under
the cost recovery scheme [14, 15]. The limited
Table 5 Impact of the FHCI on the utilisation of maternal health services
Model 1 (M1) Model 2 (M2) LL test (M2 vs. M1)
May’10 June’10a May’10 June’10
Antenatal care (ANC) visits in public facilitiesb
Coefficients
Time trend 0.016 0.019*
Policy 0.282** 0.245* 1.066** 1.059*
Policy * Time trend −0.026* −0.029*
Marginal effects (%)
Policy 1.0* 0.8* 4.2 4.1 3.38
Four ANC visits in public facilities (ANC4)b
Coefficients
Time trend 0.004 0.003
Policy 0.118* 0.125** 0.260 0.396
Policy * Time trend −0.005 −0.007
Marginal effects (%)
Policy 2.0* 2.2** 4.6 7.0 0.7
Delivery in public facility
Coefficients
Time trend 0.012* 0.006
Policy 0.231*** 0.295*** 0.208* 0.330**
Policy * Time trend −0.007 −0.005
Marginal effects (%)
Policy 4.8*** 6.1*** 4.3* 6.8** 9.34
Delivery in private facilityc
Coefficients
Time trend 0.002 0.009
Policy 0.081 0.081 −0.236 −0.410
Policy * Time trend 0.007 0.005
Delivery with trained health workerd
Coefficients
Time trend 0.014** 0.005
Policy 0.241*** 0.310*** 0.135 0.263*
Policy * Time trend −0.007 −0.002
Marginal effects (%)
Policy 4.6*** 6.0*** 2.6 5.1* 16.87
Postnatal care within 48 h
Coefficients
Time trend 0.033*** 0.034***
Policy 1.046*** 1.072*** 0.635*** 0.814***
Policy * Time trend −0.013 −0.017**
Marginal effects (%)
Policy 14.1*** 15.2*** 9.1*** 11.7*** 89.8
Vitamin A given postnatally
Coefficients
Time trend 0.002 0.002
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Table 5 Impact of the FHCI on the utilisation of maternal health services (Continued)
Policy 0.035 −0.081 0.782*** 0.924***
Policy * trend −0.022* −0.024**
Marginal effects (%)
Policy 0.5 −1.2 13.2*** 15.6*** 116
Infant DPT full coursee, f
Coefficients
Time trend 0.026*** 0.026***
Policy 0.670*** 0.671*** 0.536*** 0.727***
Policy * Time trend −0.014 −0.019**
Marginal effects (%)
Policy 13.4*** 13.3*** 11.0*** 14.0*** 574
All models control for covariates listed in Table 4 & estimated with district and time (month) random effects
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
aAlternative policy impact date suggested by the breakpoint function utilised
bPolicy implementation assumed to be 9 months prior to delivery date
cMarginal effects could not be estimated
dIncludes doctor, midwife and MCH aide
eSlightly lower but still significant result recorded where mother reported vaccinations also included
fDeliveries excluded from November 2012 to allow for 1 year vaccination period
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cial barriers to accessing care may therefore ex-
plain the limited impact observed with the
utilisation of public health facilities.
Additional factors that may be impeding greater im-
pact include the remaining costs of accessing ‘free’ care,
such as transportation costs which can be significant
and sometimes more significant than user fees them-
selves [20]; and the extent to which human resource fac-
tors are successfully addressed and support positive staff
attitudes to patients claiming exemptions and constrain
the denial of exemptions or emergence of informal
charges [21].
As expected, no effect is observed with the use of
formal private care facilities but interestingly, we ob-
serve a significantly higher use of informal health
care services among non-eligible children. This has
important implications for the health of non-eligible
children who appear to be seeking less expensive
and potentially lower quality care from informal
health providers and vendors. The absence of an ef-
fect on the probability of paying for health care ser-
vices (and with the level of payments made) is
expected given that the FHCI does not apply in in-
formal health facilities.
For maternal care, the before- after analysis ad-
justed for time-trends suggests that the use of pub-
lic facilities for delivery and postnatal care by
women as well as for vaccination of infants in-
creased in the post-FHCI period. The improvement
is greater if a lagged effect (2 months) of policy isassumed. The policy changes are statistically signifi-
cant and substantial but the impact seems to de-
grade over time, reflected in the negative
interaction terms that reduce the pre-policy trend
improvements in outcomes. These findings are sup-
ported by other studies which showed that the
positive effect of the FHCI on utilisation observed
within the first few months of implementation was
not sustained [4, 8].
While not a focus of this study, it is worth not-
ing that the improvements observed in the use of
maternal health services may not necessarily trans-
late into better health outcomes for mothers and
children. For example, between the 2008 and 2013
DHS, no significant change was observed in infant
and under-five mortality. Maternal mortality on the
other hand appeared to have increased (although
not statistically significant). Nevertheless in 2013,
Sierra Leone ranked highest globally in terms of
maternal mortality ratio [22].
Limitations of this study relate to methods and the
time period for which data are available. The policy
was introduced at a single time point for the whole
country, which did not allow for control groups suit-
able for comparing with those affected. For the ana-
lysis of maternal health-seeking behaviour, the lack
of a control group means that we cannot compare
changes in the intervention group with a comparable
counterfactual. We mitigate this to some extent by
examining the effect on service use in the months
before and after the implementation of the policy
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model. We cannot be sure, however, that a similar
change would not have occurred in a counterfactual
group although it does seem unlikely that the same
monthly changes would have been observed unless a
separate policy with similar expected effects had
been implemented at the same time. We are not
aware of such a policy.
For the effect on children, the RDD approach per-
mits the identification of effect using one time
period. However, we are unable to verify causality of
effect [23]. Instead an intention- to-treat effect is es-
timated due to lack of direct information on whether
children were completely exempted from paying any
fees in public health facilities. In this study receipt
of free health care was inferred from responses to
two survey questions – the use of health care ser-
vices and consultation and prescription expenditure
incurred as a result. We assume that children re-
ceived free health care if no consultation and pre-
scription expenditure was reported following a visit
to a health facility. However, we cannot rule out
payments made for the use of other health services
such as diagnostic services. Furthermore, frequent
medicine and medical supply shortages and stock-
outs within health facilities [14, 15, 19] may result in
‘zero’ prescription expenditure being reported not
because medication was received free of charge but
because prescribed medicines were not available. A
future household survey might aim to include a
question about the exemption experience of children
and mothers to allow identification of causal effects.
Furthermore, the RDD is undertaken using data that
were collected relatively soon after policy implemen-
tation. It may be that as the policy becomes better
known and embedded in the system, the effect may
increase. The declining effect on maternal service
use is salutary, however, suggesting if anything, a re-
ducing impact over time. Of course, in the period in
which it might have settled and stabilised, the Ebola
outbreak disrupted every aspect of health care
provision in the country and therefore the availabil-
ity of further data for later periods will not be able
to settle this question.
Conclusion
As with other cases of policy that focuses on re-
lieving demand side constraints to health service
use, impact is constrained by supply side capacity
[21, 24]. In Sierra Leone’s case, a number of mea-
sures were taken to strengthen supply-side capacity,
especially in relation to human resources [7, 21].
While some progress appears to have been made
with the health workforce [7], the evidencesuggests that supply side reforms were insufficient
[21], perhaps especially in relation to ensuring suf-
ficient medicines supply to support those receiving
services under the FHCI. It is possible that the in-
significant apparent effect of the FHCI on out-of-
pocket expenditures made on behalf of children
reflects weak monitoring and accountability within
the medicines procurement and supply chain sys-
tem [14, 15, 19]. Problems of service under-
utilisation cannot be resolved by addressing the de-
mand-side constraints only and supply-side con-
straints will have to be sufficiently addressed before
the full potential of the FHCI can be realised. For
example, governance and accountability within
health facilities might be reinforced through the
use of payment mechanisms (such as payment for
performance) that explicitly reimburse health facil-
ities for providing services to beneficiaries of the
FHCI [25]. Other supplementary demand-side pol-
icies that address physical barriers to accessing
health facilities are equally germane particularly in
rural areas where health facilities are sparsely dis-
tributed and accessibility made worse by poor road
networks [26].
The 2014–15 Ebola out-break in Sierra Leone has
cast the failings of its health system into sharp relief,
but may also be the harbinger of new resources and
commitment to health system strengthening, through
which a reinforced FHCI might achieve its undoubted
potential to improve women and children’s access to
health care.Endnotes
1These include traditional healers, traditional
birth attendants, spiritualist, patent medicine
vendors and other health workers in undefined
facilities.
2Health care expenditure was originally collected in
Leones. We converted this to USD using 2011 exchange
rate.
3Here, a binary variable that describes beneficiaries
of the FHCI captures the treatment effect as the differ-
ence in outcomes between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries.
4Free health care is inferred from reporting visits to a
health care facility and zero consultation and prescrip-
tion expenditure.
5Model specification yielding the lowest AIC is consid-
ered the optimal specification that best fits the data.
6Figures 4, 5, 6 are estimated similarly to Figs. 1, 2, 3.
7For delivery with a skilled health worker, the
function estimates a breakpoint in June 2010, Wald
test p < 0.001.
Edoka et al. Health Economics Review  (2016) 6:19 Page 14 of 15Appendix 1Table 6 Impact of the FHCI in Public/NGO/Missionary Health Facilities by Household Location
Rural Urban
Simple linear Linear interaction Quadratic interaction Simple linear Linear interaction Quadratic interaction
Utilisation (LPM)
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) −0.0614 −0.0534 −0.0516 −0.0243 −0.0039 0.265
(0.057) (0.063) (0.102) (0.124) (0.120) (0.195)
N 1200 1200 1200 433 433 433
AIC 1554.1a 1555.9 1559.5 587.2 587.7 581.8a
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) −0.136* −0.143** −0.162 −0.159 −0.169 0.113
(0.073) (0.072) (0.119) (0.173) (0.174) (0.256)
N 707 707 707 208 208 208
AIC 900.3a 902.0 905.9 283.3a 285.0 285.6
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) −0.210 −0.276 0.563 0.709 0.517 −4.024
(0.424) (0.508) (1.302) (1.165) (0.915) (4.105)
N 707 707 707 208 208 208
AIC 586.2 585.9 585.6a 878.4 876.2 875.7a
Control variables includes region dummies, head of households’ age and education
Standard errors in parentheses
LPM linear probability model
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05
aOptimal model specificationAppendix 2Table 7 Impact of the FHCI in Public/NGO/Missionary Health Facilities by Total Household Expenditure
Below median expenditure Above median expenditure
Simple linear Linear interaction Quadratic interaction Simple linear Linear interaction Quadratic interaction
Utilisation (LPM)
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) 0.0394 0.0495 0.113 −0.0843 −0.0702 0.130
(0.073) (0.077) (0.118) (0.078) (0.076) (0.155)
N 799 799 799 834 834 834
AIC 1092.1a 1093.7 1094.6 1115.6 1117.1 1115.6
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) −0.125 −0.151* −0.00640 −0.149 −0.140 −0.149
(0.090) (0.090) (0.141) (0.097) (0.098) (0.170)
N 445 445 445 470 470 470
AIC 578.1 577.7a 580.4 607.8a 609.5 613.2
ITT effect (Age≥ 5 years) 0.413 0.406 0.866 −0.0412 −0.0249 −2.412
(0.499) (0.398) (1.876) (0.603) (0.585) (4.017)
N 445 445 445 470 470 470
AIC 615.1 614.4 613.0a 705.0 704.7 703.6a
Control variables includes region dummies, head of households’ age and education
Standard errors in parentheses
LPM linear probability model
*p < 0.1
aOptimal model specification
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